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Introduction
Stability is an essential requirement for political institutions; however it is both a
theoretical and an empirical fact that political institutions are often unstable. Insta-
bility occurs when contradictory forces prevent the emergence of a persistent outcome,
that is a state that is self-sustained and defendable when it is subject to attacks aiming
to dismantle it. What can be observed when instability occurs is a volatile situation:
any outcome that is proposed is subject to obstruction by some factions that block it.
The result is a stalemate, where the institution is deadlocked. As far as the governance
or the constitution of an established state is concerned, such a deadlock paves the way
for a dramatic change of the institution itself; the latter is necessarily exogenous since
no endogenous solution can be expected. In [2] and [3] the author argues that, how-
ever chaotic it may seem at first sight, instability in regulated systems presents some
regularity and therefore there exist “patterns of instability”.
Our basic model for analyzing interactions consists of a strategic game form G
and some solution concept say E . We shall say that such a mechanism is stable if it
has solutions for all preference profiles. The absence of solution results from conflicting
relations between preferences of the agents and the opposition power that the game form
allocates to active agents or coalitions. If groups of alternatives are merged together, the
power distribution being preserved, then preferences become comparatively smoothed
and a solution may emerge. Merging alternatives amounts to making a partition of
the alternative set in such a way that agents are indifferent between elements of the
same class. The minimal size of such a partition with no solution is the stability index.
It is well known ([2] [3]) that instability for the pair (G, E) is closely related to the
existence of some generalized Condorcet cycle, and that the stability index is equal to
the minimal size of such a cycle. In [2] some general properties related to the structure
of instability have been shown for the core and the exact core. In [3] the study has
been extended to Nash-like solutions including Nash proper and strong Nash.
In this paper we characterize stability and we compute the stability index of the
meet game form. Let (A,∧) be a meet semilattice. The n-player meet game form on A
is defined as follows: each player chooses xi ∈ A, the outcome is given by µ(x1, . . . , xn)
= x1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn. While this game form can be hardly favored by a social engineer, or
defended on philosophical or normative grounds1, it may represent a simple model for
static interactive pollution. If every player selects a vector of pollution levels (CO2,
radiation, etc ...) represented by some vector in Rd, then the resulting outcome is the
infimum (or the supremum) of individual vectors.
It appears from [2] and [3], that given some game form, an effective calculation of the
stability index for the core is not an easy matter, let alone the stability index for Nash
equilibrium. Here, the particular game form that we propose allows us to carry out
such calculations. Given the importance of the subject for political systems, we hope
that the neatness of the results presented in this paper beyond its technical difficulties
1As a referee of an earlier version of this paper put it: this is not one which would come up
immediately in connection with any realistic problem of social choice. Initially, my choice was motivated
mainly by practical reasons, which is why I did not try to justify it on social choice grounds. However,
on a second thought, this game form, with only little exaggeration is the de facto decision rule for a
wide range of European Union issues.
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and the modesty of its scope provides an invitation to future more comprehensive
research on this problem.
Let M be any subset of non empty coalitions. Solutions that are considered in
this paper are either the β-core, or the exact-core or Nash-like equilibrium where only
coalitions in M are active. It turns out, that stability and the stability index depend
on three parameters: On the side of the players the Nakamura number or νM, and on
the side of the alternative set, the depth of A or δA and the gap function or γA.
In the first section we present the stability problem as well as the theoretical tools
for the analysis of the stability index. Section 2 is devoted to the meet game form on
a semilattice. In particular two notions are defined for any semilattice: the depth and
the gap functions. They play an essential role along with the Nakamura number in
the characterization of stability and the stability index. Moreover section 2 shows that
all what is needed for our purpose is to know the local effectivity function of the meet
game form. In section 3 we prove the main results on stability and stability index of
the meet game form. Some technical proofs relative to binary relations are the object
of an appendix.
1 Game forms
1.1 Notations
Throughout this paper we shall consider a finite set N = {1, . . . , n} the elements of
which are called players, and a finite set A = {a1, . . . , ap} the elements of which are
called alternatives. We make use of the following notational conventions: For any set
X, we denote by P(X) the set of all subsets of X and by P0(X) = P(X)\{∅} the set
of all non-empty subsets of X. Q(X) (resp. L(X )) will denote the set of all preorders
(resp. linear orders) on X, that is all binary relations on X which are transitive and
complete (resp. transitive, complete and antisymmetric). If R ∈ Q(X) we denote by
R◦ (resp. R∼) the strict binary relation (resp. the equivalence relation) induced by R
on X. Elements of P0(N) are called coalitions. If S ∈ P0(N) then N\S is denoted S
c.
Similarly if B ∈ P(A), A\B is denoted Bc. A preference profile (over A) is a map from
N to Q(A), so that a preference profile is an element of Q(A)N . For every preference
profile RN ∈ Q(A)
N and S ∈ P0(N) we put
P (a, S,RN ) = {b ∈ A | b R
◦
i a, ∀i ∈ S}
(so that P (a, S,RN ) consists of all the outcomes considered to be strictly better than
a by all members of coalition S).
1.2 Solutions, stability and index
Let G = 〈X1, . . . ,Xn, A, g〉 be a strategic game form. The set of players is N =
{1, . . . , n}, Xi is the strategy set of players i, g :
∏
i∈N Xi → A is the outcome function,
assumed to be surjective. For any S ∈ P0(N) the product
∏
i∈S Xi will be denoted
XS . Given any preference profile RN ∈ Q(A)
N , the game form G induces a game
(X1, . . . ,Xn;Q1, . . . , Qn) with the same strategy spaces and where Qi is the preorder
on XN defined by: xN Qi yN if and only if g(xN )Ri g(yN ) for xN , yN ∈ XN . We denote
this game by G(RN ).
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For our solution concepts we shall assume that only some coalitions can form. Any
M⊂ P0(N) is called an active coalition structure. The first solution concept is similar
to Nash equilibrium. It has been introduced in [8] (definition 5.1.6):
A strategy array xN ∈ XN is an M-equilibrium of the game G(RN ) if there is
no coalition S ∈ M and yS ∈ XS such that g(yS , xSc) R
◦
i g(xN ) for all i ∈ S. An
alternative a is an M-equilibrium outcome of G at RN if there exists some equilibrium
xN ∈ XN of G(RN ) such that g(xN ) = a. We denote by EO(M)(G,RN ) the set of all
M-equilibrium outcomes of (G,RN ). In particular, whenM = N ≡ {{1}, . . . , {n}}, an
M-equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. Similarly, whenM = P0(N), an M-equilibrium
is a strong Nash equilibrium.
The following solutions have been defined respectively in [1] and [6]:
An alternative a is in the M-exact core of (G,RN ) if there is no coalition S ∈ M
with the following property : for any zN ∈ XN such that g(zN ) = a there exists yS ∈ XS
such that g(yS , zSc) R
◦
i g(zN ) for all i ∈ S. Denote by C1,M(G,RN ) the M-exact core
of (G,RN ).
An alternative a is in the M-β-core of (G,RN ) if there is no coalition S ∈M with
the following property: for any zN ∈ XN , there exists yS ∈ XS such that g(yS , zSc) R
◦
i a
for all i ∈ S. Denote by C0,M(G,RN ), the M-β-core of (G,RN ).
Let Π be the set of all partitions of A. If π ∈ Π and a ∈ A we denote by π(a) the
class of the partition that contains a. Let Q•(π) be the set of all R ∈ Q(A) such that
whenever π(a) = π(b) then aR∼b. Let π, π′ ∈ Π. π refines π′, if every element of π is
included in some element of π′. If π refines π′ then Q•(π) ⊂ Q•(π
′).
Let Πr be the set of all partitions of A with r elements. Since any element of Πr
has a refinement in Πr+1, then {Q•(π) : π ∈ Πr} ⊂ {Q•(π) : π ∈ Πr+1} for any r ≥ 1.
Moreover {Q•(π)|π ∈ Π1} is a singleton and {Q•(π)|π ∈ Πp} = Q(A). We say that
G is r-M-solvable if EO(M)(G,RN ) 6= ∅ for all RN ∈ Q•(π)
N and all π ∈ Πr. G is
r-M-exactly stable if C1,M(G,RN ) 6= ∅ for all RN ∈ Q•(π)
N and all π ∈ Πr. G is
r-M-β-stable if C0,M(G,RN ) 6= ∅ for all RN ∈ Q•(π)
N and all π ∈ Πr. We say that
G is M-solvable if G is r-M-solvable for all r ≥ 1. Similar definitions can be made for
the M-exact core and the M-β-core.
Definition 1.1 The stability index of G relatively to the M-equilibrium (resp. M-
exact core, resp. M-β-core) is the smallest integer r ≥ 1 such G is not r-M-solvable
(resp. r-M-exactly stable, r-M-β-stable) (with the convention that the index is +∞
if no such integer exists).
When it is finite, the stability index is an integer that can take values ranging from
2 to p (p is the number of elements of the alternative set) and it depends on the pair
composed of the game form and the solution concept. This index defines a threshold
on the sophistication level of a society that can safely use the game form (ruled by
that solution). If stability is out of reach, the social engineer is led to recommend
institutions with a rather high stability index. Indeed we shall see below that this
number is equal to the length of some generalized Condorcet cycle and it has been
argued in [2] and [3] that longer cycles are more costly than shorter ones and therefore
a game form with a higher index is less likely to incur instability. In many countries,
the society splits over two main issues. There are two main parties. Each party can
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defend one issue but cannot force that issue. The result is a typical deadlock that,
in our theory would be represented by an interaction with stability index equal to 2.
Empirically, countries with ethnic or religious division are often deadlocked by such a
picture. Violence is the likely conclusion of the stalemate. On the other hand a typical
situation with index 3 allows some governance (if we take time into consideration), but
such a governance is precarious since any alliance of two parties can be threatened by
a third party that eventually succeeds in breaking the alliance, only to fall in a new
precarious state. More generally the study of cycle formation sheds a light on the form
of instability that threatens a political interaction.
The theoretical aspects of the stability index have been exposed in [2] and [3]. In the
first paper only the stability index of the exact core and the β-core has been defined and
computed. It turns out that, for the mentioned solutions, the stability index is 2, 3 or
+∞ (for more details see [2] Proposition 4.18). When it comes to Nash equilibrium and
strong Nash equilibrium, some general result can be found in [3], but the study points
out the difficulty to calculate the Nash stability index except for some special classes of
game forms (e.g. rectangular game forms). A second difficulty arises from the fact that
in the case of Nash-like equilibrium solutions, effectivity functions are not appropriate
to the description of the the underlying power, and one is led to define more complex
objects for that purpose. By contrast, the game form that we study in this paper has
the property that only the local effectivity functions is required (see theorems 2.7 and
2.8 below) and thus the calculations can be carried out to the conclusion.
The object of this paper is to give necessary and sufficient conditions for stability
and to determine the stability index of the following game form, called the meet game
form Γ = 〈X1, . . . ,Xn, A, µ〉, where X1 = · · · = Xn = A, A is a meet-semilattice
(precise definitions are given below), and µ is the meet function that is:
µ(x1, . . . , xn) = x1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn (x1 ∈ A, . . . , xn ∈ A). (1)
The method that we follow to characterize stability and to calculate the stability
index is based on the distribution of power that underlies the solution concept. As
we shall see, for such a power distribution, instability takes the familiar form of the
existence of some Condorcet-like cycle. The stability index is closely related to the
minimal length of a cycle. The power distribution that we need is known as the local
effectivity function.
1.3 Power distribution, effectivity structure and cycles
Definition 1.2 A local effectivity function on (N,A) is a family E ≡ (E[U ], U ∈
P0(A)) where for any U ∈ P0(A), E[U ] : P(N)→ P(P0(A)) and such that the following
conditions are satisfied:
(i) E[U ](∅) = ∅,
(ii) B ∈ E[U ](S), B ⊂ B′ ⇒ B′ ∈ E[U ](S),
(iii) U ⊂ V ⇒ E[V ](S) ⊂ E[U ](S).
A local effectivity function is an effectivity function if it does not depend on U .
The formula B ∈ E[U ](S) is interpreted as follows: When the current state is in U ,
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coalition S can threaten to achieve some state in B. Let RN ∈ Q(A)
N . An alternative
a ∈ A is dominated at RN if there exists U ∈ P0(A), S ∈ P0(N) such that a ∈ U and
P (a, S,RN ) ∈ E[U ](S). The core of E at RN is the set of undominated alternatives. It
is denoted C(E,RN ). We say that E is r-stable if C(E,RN ) 6= ∅ for all RN ∈ Q•(π)
N
and all π ∈ Πr. We say that E is stable if E is r-stable for all r ≥ 1. The stability
index of E is the minimal integer r such that E is not r-stable (with the convention
that this index is +∞ if E is stable). It will be denoted σ(E).
Let G be a strategic game form. We are now ready to determine the underling power
distribution in G relatively to the exact core and the β-core. For any coalition S and
any alternative a, the idea is to describe the retaliation power of S if the current issue is
a. This will be represented by the set of all B ⊂ A that satisfy the following property:
if g(x) = a, then for some strategy yS ∈ XS , g(xSc , yS) ∈ B. This set is therefore the
following:
EG1,M[a](S) = {B ∈ P0(A)| ∀xN ∈ g
−1(a),∃yS ∈ XS : g(xSc , yS) ∈ B}
The local effectivity function EG
1,M associated to (G,M) is defined as follows: For
U ∈ P0(A), S /∈M: E
G
1,M[U ](S) = ∅, and for S ∈M:
EG1,M[U ](S) = ∩a∈UE
G
1,M[a](S)
The β-effectivity function associated to (G,M) is defined by EG
0,M(S) = E
G
1,M[A](S)
(S ∈ P(N)).
Lemma 1.3 The M-exact core (resp. M-β-core) of (G,RN ) coincides with the core
of EG
1,M (resp. E
G
0,M) at RN . Therefore G is r-M-exactly stable (resp. r-M-β-stable)
if and only if EG
1,M (resp. E
G
0,M ) is r-stable. In particular the stability index relatively
to the M-exact core of G is equal to the stability index of EG
1,M.
Proof. Straightforward. 2
In general the power distribution relative to M-equilibrium exceeds the local ef-
fectivity function and requires more complex effectivity structures ([1]). However, we
shall see, that in the case of the meet game form, the local effectivity function does the
job (Proposition 2.1). The existence of a preference profile with an empty exact core
is equivalent to the existence of some combinatorial configuration that can be viewed
as a generalized Condorcet cycle. Such a configuration has been introduced in [5] for
effectivity functions, and in [4] to more general effectivity structures. The following
definition, that can be found in [2] is an adaptation of the definition to local effectivity
functions.
Definition 1.4 Let E ba a local effectivity function. An r-tuple ((C1, B1, S1), . . . ,
(Cr, Br, Sr)) where r ≥ 1, Ck ∈ P0(A), Bk ∈ P0(A), Sk ∈ P0(N) (k = 1, . . . , r) is a
dominance configuration of E if:
(i) Bk ∈ E[Ck](Sk) (k = 1, . . . , r).
(ii) (C1, . . . , Cr) is a partition of A.
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(C1, . . . , Cr) is said to be the basis of the dominance configuration and r its length or
order.
A dominance configuration ((C1, B1, S1), . . . , (Cr, Br, Sr)) is a cycle of E if it satisfies
the following property :
(C) For any ∅ 6= J ⊂ {1, . . . , r} such that ∩k∈JSk 6= ∅, there exists ℓ ∈ J such that for
all k ∈ J : Cℓ ∩Bk = ∅.
There are other equivalent ways to express property (C):
(C’) For any ∅ 6= J ⊂ {1, . . . , r} such that ∩k∈JSk 6= ∅, there exists ℓ ∈ J such that for
all k ∈ J : Bℓ ∩Ck = ∅.
(C”) For any sequence k1, . . . , ks of elements in {1, . . . , r} either ∩
s
t=1Skt = ∅ or [Uk1 ∩
Bk2 6= ∅, . . . , Ukt ∩Bkt+1 6= ∅, . . . , Uks ∩Bk1 6= ∅]
Properties (C) and (C ′) are dual. Property (C”) was originally introduced by Keiding
[5] in the context of effectivity functions. The equivalence of these properties is easy to
prove. Initially Keiding [5] proved that stability is equivalent to the absence of cycles.
This result was extended to local effectivity functions in Abdou [2], and indeed to a
larger framework in Abdou and Keiding [4]. Here we recall the result for local effectivity
functions:
Theorem 1.5 A local effectivity function is stable if and only if it has no cycles.
While existence of a cycle implies instability, the determination of the stability
index requires a deeper knowledge of the structure of the effectivity structure. One is
supposed to find a partition π of smallest cardinality such that the core is empty for
some RN ∈ Q•(π)
N . For that purpose, the following characterization shows that it is
equivalent to determine the minimal length of a cycle. Indeed, in view of Abdou [2]
Theorem 4.4, we have:
Theorem 1.6 The stability index of a local effectivity function E is equal to the min-
imal length of a cycle of E (with the convention that this number is +∞ if E has no
cycle)
2 The meet game form
A partially ordered set, or poset, is a pair (A,≥) where ≥ is a binary relation on A
that is reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric. A poset is a meet semilattice if any pair
{x, y} ⊂ A has an infimum, that is a greatest lower bound, denoted x∧y. The infimum
of any family (x1, . . . , xk) will be denoted x1∧· · ·∧xk. In this section (A,≥) is assumed
to be a finite meet semilattice and Γ = 〈X1, . . . ,Xn, A, µ〉 is the meet game form (1)
defined on A. Γ has the following remarkable property:
Proposition 2.1 For any RN ∈ Q(A)
N , an outcome is an M-equilibrium outcome of
Γ if and only if it is in the M- exact core of Γ that is :
EO(M)(Γ, RN ) = C1,M(Γ, RN )
.
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Proof. EO(M)(Γ, RN ) ⊂ C1,M(Γ, RN ) for any game form. In order to prove the
opposite inclusion, let a /∈ EO(M)(Γ, RN ). For any x = (x1, . . . , xn) such that µ(x) =
a, there exists some Sx ∈M and ySx such that µ(xScx , ySx)R
◦
i a for all i ∈ Sx. The main
point is to prove that one can choose some “deviation ” (Sx, yScx) that does not depend
on x. Let S be the coalition corresponding to x¯ = (a, . . . , a) and let b = µ(x¯Sc , yS).
One has bR◦i a for all i ∈ S. Let c = ∧i∈Syi. Then a ∧ c = b. Clearly b 6= a. If
S = N then for any x such that µ(x) = a, µ(yN ) = b = c thus a /∈ C1,M(Γ, RN ). If
S 6= N then b < a. Let bS ∈ A
S with all components equal to b. For any x such that
µ(x) = a one has: b < a ≤ ∧j∈Scxj. It follows that µ(xSc , bS) = (∧j∈Scxj) ∧ b = b.
Again a /∈ C1,M(Γ, RN ). 2
Corollary 2.2 The meet game form Γ is M-solvable if and only if it is M-exactly
stable. The stability index of Γ is the same whether we consider the M-exact core or
the M-equilibrium.
Thus studying stability of the local effectivity function is sufficient not only forM-exact
stability of Γ, but also for its M-solvability. Here is its precise description for any M:
Proposition 2.3 For U ∈ P0(A), one has :
EΓ1,M[U ](S) =


{B ∈ P0(A) | ∀a ∈ U,∃b ∈ B : a ≥ b} if S ∈M, S 6= N
P0(A) if S ∈M, S = N
∅ if S /∈M
Proof. Since EΓ
1,M[U ](S) = ∩a∈UE
Γ
1,M[a](S), it is enough to prove the formula for
EΓ
1,M[a](S) (a ∈ A). That E
Γ
1,M[a](N) = P0(A) is straightforward. Let S ∈ P0(N),
S 6= N and let B ∈ P0(A) and b ∈ A such that b ∈ B and b ≤ a. Let bS ∈ A
S
with all components equal to b. For any x such that µ(x) = a, b ≤ a ≤ (∧j∈Scxj).
Thus µ(xSc , bS) = (∧j∈Scxj) ∧ b = b. Therefore B ∈ E
Γ
1,M[a](S). Conversely if B ∈
EΓ1,M[a](S), then in particular taking x = (a, . . . , a) ∈ A
N there exists yS ∈ A
S such
that µ(xS , ySc) ∈ B. Since µ(xS , ySc) ≤ a, the proof is complete. 2.
As a hint of the technical tools needed for our purpose, one can consider a special
kind of cycle as a sequence a1, S1, a2, S2, . . . , ap+1, where {a1, . . . , ap} = A and ap+1 =
a1, and with the condition that, starting at ak, coalition Sk can reach ak+1. Therefore
the following conditions must be satisfied (1) if Sk ∈ M and Sk 6= N then ak+1 < ak,
and (2) the intersection of S1 . . . , Sp must be empty (in order to satisfy property (C”)
of Definition 1.4). We shall refer informally to such a sequence as a circular domination
chain. Figure 2 represents a set of 5 alternatives, with a semilattice structure, the strict
part of it being represented by arrows. Consider the sequence a1, S1, a2, . . . , a5, S5, a1.
Domination is possible only if S1 = S2 = S3 = S4 = N . Thus ∩
k=5
k=1Sk = S 6= ∅. It
follows that such a sequence is not a cyclic domination chain. Figure 1 represents a
sequence in the lattice {1, 2, 3, 4} with its natural order : e1, S1, e2, . . . , e4, S4, e1. The
latter is a circular domination chain if and only if S4 = N and ∩
k=3
k=1Sk = ∅.
The examples suggest that the parameters involved in the formation of cycles are
two-fold. On the player side, chains of coalitions with non empty intersections will play
an important role. This is why we introduce the following (Nakamura [7]):
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Definition 2.4 A nonempty subset T ⊂ M has the empty intersection property if
∩S∈T S = ∅. The Nakamura Number of M, denoted νM, is the minimum of the
cardinality of T where T describes all the subsets of M with the empty intersection
property (with the convention that this number is +∞ if no subset ofM has the empty
intersection property).
•3 •2
•1•4
e1
e2 e3
e4
-
6
?
. . . . . . . . . . . .
S1
S2
S3
N
Figure 1: A circular domination chain in the lattice I4 with its natural order: aց b if and only
if a > b
When it comes to alternatives, one has to take into account the semilattice structure.
In a circular chain, any couple (ak, ak+1) will be called step if ak+1 < ak and gap
otherwise. In order to characterize stability we shall need to consider chains with the
largest number of steps and in order to determine the stability index we shall also need
to find, among these chains, one with the smallest number of gaps. In the following
subsection we provide the precise definitions that are needed for our characterization.
2.1 Steps and gaps of a binary relation
Let N∗ = {1, 2, . . .} denote the set of strictly positive natural numbers. For q ∈ N∗
let Iq denote the interval {1, . . . , q}, and Z/qZ the quotient of Z by the its additive
subgroup qZ. Addition in Z/qZ is the addition modulo q. Let (A, ց ) be a binary
relation on A. A couple (a, b) ∈ A × A such that aց b will be called a step. Let
q ∈ N∗. A q-enumeration of A is an injective mapping e : Z/qZ → A. Let e be a
q-enumeration of A. An e-edge is any ordered pair of the form v = (ek, ek+1) where
k ∈ Z/qZ. Thus a 1-enumeration e has only one edge (e1, e1). Two e-edges v and w
are said to be adjacent if v = (ek, ek+1) and w = (eℓ, eℓ+1) and k + 1 = ℓ. An e-chain
is any sequence c = (v1, . . . , vr) of distinct e-edges such that vk and vk+1 are adjacent
(k = 1, . . . , r − 1). The length of c is the number of its e-edges. It is denoted |c|. Since
• • • •
•
a2 a3 a4 a5
a1
SN
NNN
PPPPPPPPPPPq
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
@
@
@R?
)
Figure 2: aց b iff there is an arrow from a to b. No circular domination chain can be found
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there is no repetition of edges in a chain: |c| ≤ q. There are exactly q e-chains with
length q, where only the initial vertex differ; we shall identify them all with e. An
e-edge is an e-step if it is a step. We usually use the same notation for an e-chain (a
sequence of e-edges) and the set of its edges. Thus c ∩ c′ = ∅ means that c and c′ do
not have common edges. Let c and c′ be two e-chains such that c′ ⊂ c. We say that c′
is a c-gap if c′ contains no steps and if it is maximal for inclusion in c for this property.
If c is an e-chain, we denote by d(c) the number of e-steps in c, and g(c) the number
of c-gaps. It is easy to see that d(c) + g(c) ≤ |c|. For k ≥ 1, let Cke be the set of all
e-chains such that d(c) = k. We introduce the following numbers related to the binary
relation (A, ց ):
δA = maxe d(e) where e describes all the set of p-enumerations.
γe(k) = minc∈Cke g(c) with the convention γe(k) = +∞ if C
k
e = ∅.
γA(k) = mine γe(k) where e describes all the set of p-enumerations.
δA will be called the depth of A, γe(·) will be called the gap function of e and γA(·)
will be call the gap function of A. Remark that γe and γA are increasing functions. By
convention γe(+∞) = γA(+∞) = +∞.
A binary relation (A, ց ) is said to be acyclic if for any q ∈ N∗, any q-enumeration
e contains at least one e-gap. If (A, ց ) is acyclic, then in particular it is irreflexive
that is one never has xցx for x ∈ A. To any poset (A,≥) one can associate the binary
relation (A,>) where x > y if and only if x ≥ y and x 6= y. (A,>) is then an acyclic
binary relation.
Examples 2.5 (a) Let A = Ip = {1, . . . , p} and aցb if and only if a = b+1 (addition
in N). Then (A, ց ) is acyclic. Let e be the p-enumeration e(k) = p − k + 1 (mod p)
then δA = d(e) = p− 1. γe(k) = 0 if 1 ≤ k < p, γe(k) = +∞ if k ≥ p. γA = γe.
(b) Let A = Z/pZ (p ≥ 2) and aց b if and only if a = b+ 1 (addition in Z/pZ). Then
(A, ց ) is not acyclic. Let e be the p-enumeration e(k) = p− k+1 then δA = d(e) = p.
γe(k) = 0 if 1 ≤ k ≤ p, γe(k) = +∞ if k > p. γA = γe.
(c) Let A = Ip (p ≥ 2) and aցց b if and only if a 6= 1 and b = 1 or a = b. Then (A, ցց )
is a meet semilattice, hence acyclic. Let e be the p-enumeration e(k) = p− k + 1 then
δA = d(e) = 1. γe(k) = 1 if k = 1, γe(k) = +∞ if k > 1. γA = γe.
(d) Let A = (Im)
d and (a1, a2, . . . , ad) ≥ (b1, b2, . . . , bd) if and only if ai ≥ bi(i =
1, . . . , d). Then (A,≥) is a lattice. What are δA and γA ?
Proposition 2.6 Let (A, ց ) be an acyclic binary relation, and let k ≥ 1. Then:
(i) δA is the maximum of d(e) where e describes the union of all q-enumerations (q =
1, . . . , p).
(ii) γA(k) is the minimum of γe(k) where e describes the union of all q-enumerations
(q = 1, . . . , p).
Proof. See appendix. 2
We are now ready to state the main results on stability and stability index of the
meet game form:
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Theorem 2.7 For any M, the meet game form Γ is M-β-stable. Γ is M-exactly
stable (and therefore M-solvable) if and only if either N /∈M or δA < νM.
In particular the meet game form is Nash solvable. If n ≥ 2 and M = P0(N), then
νM = 2. Thus the meet game form is strongly solvable if and only if δA = 1.
Theorem 2.8 If N ∈ M, the stability index of the meet game form relatively to the
M-exact core (and therefore M -equilibrium) is equal to: νM + γA(νM) + 1.
In particular, if n ≥ 2 and M = P0(N), the strong Nash stability index of the meet
game form is equal to γA(νM) + 3. The meet game form corresponding to example
2.5(c) is similar to the unanimity game form. If all players agree on some alternative,
then the latter is chosen, if not, then 1 is chosen. Since δA = 1 < νM the game form
is M-solvable. The meet game corresponding to example 2.5(a) is not M-solvable if
N ∈ M and νM ≤ p − 1, and in this case the stability index is equal to νM + 1 since
γA(νM) = 0. In the next section we give a proof of both theorems in a slightly more
general framework.
3 Stability and Index of the meet game form
In this section we assume that (A, ց ) is an acyclic binary relation. We shall write
(aցցb) if (aց b) or (a = b). For any ∅ 6=M⊂ P0(N), we consider the local effectivity
function EM defined as follows: For U ∈ P0(A):
EM[U ](S) =


{B ∈ P0(A) | ∀a ∈ U,∃b ∈ B : aցց b} if S ∈M, S 6= N
P0(A) if S ∈M, S = N
∅ if S /∈M
The corresponding effectivity function is defined byE0,M[U ](S) = E0,M(S) = EM[A](S)
(S ∈ P(N)). Let A0 be the set of minimal elements of (A, ցց ): x ∈ A0 if and only if
there is no y ∈ A such that xցy. Since A is finite and (A, ց ) acyclic, A0 6= ∅. It is
then easy to see that, for any S ∈ M, S 6= N any B ∈ E0,M(S) contains A0. In the
case where ցց is a transitive, the converse is also true: B ∈ E0,M(S) if and only if
A0 ⊂ B.
Lemma 3.1 Let (U1, . . . , Ur) be a partition of A and let (B1, . . . , Br) be a family of
nonempty subsets of A. Then there exists a subset I = {k1, . . . , ks} where 1 ≤ s ≤ r
such that Bkj ∩ Ukj+1 6= ∅ (j = 1, . . . , s) (mod s).
Proof. Let I be the set of nonempty subsets I ⊂ Ir such that for any k ∈ I there exists
ℓ ∈ I such that Bk ∩ Uℓ 6= ∅. Clearly Ir ∈ I. Let I0 be a minimal set for inclusion
in I. For any k ∈ I0 put θ(k) one of the indices l ∈ I0 such that Bk ∩ Uℓ 6= ∅. Take
k1 ∈ I0 arbitrary and put kj+1 = θ(kj) j = 1, 2, . . . By minimality of I0, the sequence
(k1, . . . , ks) is composed of distinct indices and ks+1 = k1. 2
Theorem 3.2 E0,M is stable for any M.
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Proof. Assume that C(E0,M, RN ) = ∅ for some RN ∈ Q(A)
N . Let x0 ∈ A0. Then
P (x0, S,RN ) ∈ E0,M(S) for some S ∈ M. In view of the remark preceding Lemma
3.1, we have S = N : indeed x0 ∈ A0 and x0 /∈ P (x0, S,RN ). Therefore N ∈ M.
Moreover, one can construct by induction a sequence x0, . . . , xt+1 such that xk is
Pareto dominated by xk+1 for k = 0, . . . , t − 1 and xt+1 not Pareto dominated. Two
consequences follow: (1) xt+1 ∈ P (x0, N,RN ) and (2): there exists some S ∈ M,
S 6= N such that P (xt+1, S,RN ) ∈ E0,M(S). Since x0 ∈ A0 ⊂ P (xt+1, S,RN ) we have
x0 ∈ P (xt+1, S,RN ). The latter contradicts (1). 2
Theorem 3.3 EM is stable if and only if either N /∈M or δA < νM.
Proof. Assume that EM is not stable. Let RN ∈ Q(A)
N be such that C(EM, RN )
is empty. Put A = {a1, . . . , ap}. For any k ∈ Ip, there exists bk ∈ A and Sk ∈ M
such that {bk} ∈ EM(Sk), and bkR
◦
i ak for all i ∈ Sk. Let Uk = {ak} and Bk = {bk}.
By Lemma 3.1, there exists a subset I = {k1, . . . , ks} where 1 ≤ s ≤ p such that
bkj = akj+1 (j = 1, . . . , s) (mod s). Therefore we have (1) ∩k∈ISk = ∅. Let e(j) = bkj
for all j ∈ Z/sZ and let J = {k ∈ Ip | Sk 6= N}. For all k ∈ J , ak ցbk. Then e is
an s-enumeration, such that e(j − 1)ցe(j) if kj ∈ J . It follows first that I is not a
subset of J , for otherwise e would be a cycle for the binary relation ց and the latter
is acyclic. Therefore there exists k ∈ I such that Sk = N , hence N ∈ M. It follows
also that |J ∩ I| ≤ d(e) ≤ δA. On the other hand since e(j)R
◦
i e(j − 1) for all i ∈ Skj
(mod s) we have ∩k∈J∩ISk = ∩k∈ISk = ∅ (by (1)), so that νM ≤ |J ∩ I|. We conclude
that νM ≤ δA.
Conversely, assume that N ∈ M and νM ≤ δA. Let e be a p-enumeration such that
d(e) = δA. Let J be the set of indices k ∈ {1, . . . , p} such that ek ցek+1 (mod p). Then
|J | = δA. Let I ⊂ J such that |I| = νM. Let (Tk, k ∈ I) be a family of elements of
M such that ∩k∈ITk = ∅. We consider the p-tuple F = ((U1, B1, S1), . . . , (Up, Bp, Sp))
defined as follows: For k ∈ {1, . . . , p}, Uk := {ek}, Bk := {ek+1} (mod p); if k ∈ I,
Sk := Tk and if k /∈ I, Sk := N . Since Bk ∈ E[Uk](Sk) for all k ∈ Ip, F is a dominance
configuration. We now show that this configuration verifies property (C) of definition
1.4. Let K be any subset of {1, . . . , p} such that ∩k∈KSk 6= ∅. There exists some k0 ∈ I
such that k0 /∈ K. Let k1 be the closest index in K that appears after k0 (mod p). Thus
{k0, . . . , k1−1} is an interval in Z/qZ, that contains k0 and that has empty intersection
with K. Since k1 − 1 /∈ K, we have that ek1 /∈ {ek+1 : k ∈ K}. Since Uk1 = {ek1} and
∪k∈KBk = {ek+1 : k ∈ K}, we have proved Uk1 ∩ (∪k∈KBk) = ∅. Thus F is a cycle. 2
Theorem 3.4 Assume N ∈M. We have the equality: σ(EM) = νM + γA(νM) + 1.
Proof. We first consider the particular case where νM > δA. In view of Theorem 3.3,
EM is stable, so that σ = +∞. If νM = +∞ then the equality is verified. If νM < +∞
then by definition, since νM > δA, one has γA(νM) = +∞. Again the equality is
verified.
Assume that νM ≤ δA. Let F = ((U1, B1, S1), . . . , (Ur, Br, Sr)) be a cycle. We are going
to prove r ≥ νM+ γA(νM) + 1. In view of the structure of EM there exists ϕ : A→ A
with the following properties: (1) x ∈ Uk ⇒ ϕ(x) ∈ Bk and (2) Tk 6= N ⇒ xցϕ(x).
Since the set of minimal elements A0 is non empty we choose x1 ∈ A0. We construct a
sequence (xk) in A by induction by putting xk+1 = ϕ(xk) k = 1, 2, . . ., and a sequence
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(tk) in Ir by defining tk as the unique element in Ir such that xk ∈ Utk . Let k1 ∈ N
∗
be the smallest integer such that there exists k2 ∈ N
∗, k2 > k1 and tk1 = tk2 . Clearly
(t1, . . . , tk2−1) are all distinct. Therefore k2 − 1 ≤ r. We distinguish 4 cases:
Case 1. k1 > 1 and xk2 6= xk1. We put c = (xk1 , . . . , xk2) and e = (xk1 , . . . , xk2 , xk1). e
is a q-enumeration, c is an e-chain and q = k2 − k1 + 1. Thus q ≤ (r + 1)− 2 + 1 = r.
Case 2. k1 > 1 and xk2 = xk1. We put c = e = (xk1, . . . , xk2−1, xk2) this is a q-
enumeration with q ≤ r − 1.
Case 3. k1 = 1 and xk2 6= xk1. We put c = (xk1 , . . . , xk2) and e = (xk1 , . . . , xk2 , xk1). e
is a q-enumeration, c is an e-chain and q ≤ (r+1)−1+1 = r+1. Since xk1 = x1 ∈ A0,
(xk1 , xk1+1) is not a step.
Case 4. k1 = 1 and xk2 = xk1. We put c = e = (xk1, . . . , xk2−1, xk2) this is a q-
enumeration with q ≤ r.
First we establish a lower bound on the depth of c. Precisely we prove:
Claim. d(c) ≥ νM.
Prove of the claim. Put I = {k1, . . . , k2 − 1}, J = {k ∈ I | Stk 6= N}. We claim that:
∩k∈JStk = ∅. The proof is by contradiction: Assume that ∩k∈IStk = ∩k∈JStk 6= ∅, then
by property (C) of cycles there exists ℓ ∈ I such that for all k ∈ I : Utℓ ∩ Btk = ∅. If
ℓ 6= k1, xℓ ∈ Utℓ and xℓ = ϕ(xℓ−1) ∈ Btℓ−1 , a contradiction. If ℓ = k1, then in cases 2
and 4, xk1 ∈ Utk1 and xk1 = xk2 ∈ ϕ(xk2−1) ∈ Btk2−1 , a contradiction, and in cases 1
and 3, xk2 ∈ Utk2 = Utk1 and xk2 ∈ ϕ(xk2−1) ∈ Btk2−1 , again a contradiction. Thus we
proved ∩k∈JStk = ∅. It follows that |J | ≥ νM. Put vk = (xk, xk+1) (k ∈ I). For any
k ∈ J , vk is a step. Therefore d(c) ≥ |J |. Thus d(c) ≥ νM, and our claim is proved.
Now, we establish a lower bound on the number of gaps in e and conclude by the
desired inequality.
Cases 2 and 4. Here c = e. Using lemma A.2 for the first inequality and monotonicity
of γA for the third, one has:
g(e) ≥ γe(d(e)) + 1 ≥ γA(d(e) + 1 ≥ γA(νM) + 1
q = |e| ≥ d(e) + g(e) ≥ νM + γA(νM) + 1
Moreover r ≥ q, therefore : r ≥ νM + γA(νM) + 1.
Cases 1 and 3. Here c is an e-chain, c = e \ (xk2 , xk1).
g(c) ≥ γe(d(c)) ≥ γA(d(c) ≥ γA(νM).
Case 1. |c| ≥ d(c) + g(c) ≥ νM + γA(νM)
r ≥ q = |c|+ 1 ≥ νM + γA(νM) + 1.
Case 3. Here vk1 = (xk1 , xk1+1) is not a step. Let c
′ = c \ {vk1}. We have d(c
′) = d(c).
|c| − 1 = |c′| ≥ d(c′) + g(c′) = d(c) + g(c′) ≥ d(c) + γe(d(c)
|c| ≥ d(c) + γe(d(c) + 1 ≥ νM + γA(νM) + 1.
Since q = |c|+ 1 and r ≥ q − 1, we have: r ≥ νM + γA(νM) + 1.
In conclusion we have in all cases the inequality r ≥ νM+ γA(νM)+1. Thus σ(EM) ≥
νM + γA(νM) + 1. This ends the first part of the proof.
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Conversely let r = νM+ γA(νM)+ 1. We are going to construct a cycle of order r. Let
e be a p-enumeration and let c be an e-chain such that d(c) = νM and g(c) = γA(νM).
It follows that νM + γA(νM) ≤ |c|. Let q = |c| + 1. In view of lemma A.2, c¯, the
complement of c in e contains at least an edge that is not a step. Thus q ≤ p. Without
loss of generality let c = (e1, . . . , eq). Since r − 1 = d(c) + g(c), we can write c as a
sequence of e-steps and e-gaps (h1, . . . , hr−1). Moreover we put hr = (eq, . . . , ep, e1).
Let J be the set of indices k ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1} such that hk is a step. Let (Tk, k ∈ J)
a family of elements in M\ {N} such that ∩k∈JTk = ∅. Let f(hk) (resp. [hk]) be the
final node (resp. the set of nodes) of hk ( k ∈ Ir). In particular: f(hr) = e1. Let
Uk = [hk] \ {f(hk)}, Bk = {f(hk)} (k ∈ Ir). Let Sk = Tk for all k ∈ J and Sk = N for
all k ∈ Ir \ J . We claim that F = ((U1, B1, S1), . . . , (Ur, Br, Sr)) is a cycle of EM. The
only point that we need to verify is property (C) of definition 1.4. Let K ⊂ Ir such
that ∩k∈KSk 6= ∅. There exists some k0 ∈ J \K. Let ℓ be the first index that comes
after k0 (mod r) such that ℓ ∈ K. One has ∪k∈KBk = {f(hk) : k ∈ K}. Moreover
Uℓ ≡ [hℓ] \ {f(hℓ)} is an e-chain. Let a ∈ Uℓ. If a is the first element of the e-chain Uℓ,
then a = f(hℓ−1) and since ℓ−1 /∈ K, one has a /∈ ∪k∈KBk. If a is not the first element,
then there is no k ∈ {1 . . . , r} such that a = f(hk). It follows that Uℓ ∩ (∪k∈KBk) = ∅.
This shows that F is a cycle of order r. We conclude that σ(EM) ≤ νM+ γA(νM)+ 1.
The proof is complete. 2
Appendix
A Proof of proposition 2.6
Definition A.1 Let (A, ց ) be a binary relation, let e be a q-enumeration. A p-
enumeration e˜ is an extension of e if there exists k ∈ Iq such that (ek+1, ek+2, . . . , ek+q)
(mod q ) is an e˜-chain.
Lemma A.2 Let (A, ց ) be a binary relation. Let e be a q-enumeration containing
some gap h. For any e-chain c there corresponds some e-chain c′ such that d(c′) = d(c)
and c′ ∩h = ∅. For any k ≥ 1, any e-chain c such that g(c) = γe(k) leaves some gap in
its complement. In particular : g(c) < g(e).
Proof. All the e-steps are in the complement of h, in particular the e-steps of c. Thus
one can find c′ in the complement of h with the same e-steps that belong to c (but with
possibly different gaps). It follows in particular that g(c′) < g(e). Any e-chain c such
that g(c) = γe(k) must leave some gap in his complement, otherwise g(e) = g(c). Now
by the first part of the proof there would exist c′ such g(c′) < g(e), this contradicts the
inequality g(c) ≤ g(c′) implied by the definition of γe(k). 2
Lemma A.3 Let (A, ց ) be a binary relation. Let e be a q-enumeration containing
some gap h and some chain c that do not intersect. Then there exists an extension e˜
of e such that c is an e˜-chain.
Proof. Let B = A \ {e1, . . . , eq}. Then |B| = p − q. Let f be any bijection between
Ip−q and B. Without loss of generality let (eq, e1) be some e-edge of h. One can define
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e˜ as follows: e˜(ℓ) = e(ℓ) for ℓ ∈ Iq and e˜(q+ k) = f(k) for any k ∈ Ip−q. It is clear that
c is an e˜-chain. 2.
Proof of Proposition 2.6. (i) If e is a q-enumeration, such that d(e) achieves the maxi-
mum defined in the statement, then, in view of the acyclicity of the binary relation and
lemma A.2, there exists some e-chain c of e and some e-gap h such that d(c) = d(e)
and h does not interset c. In view of lemma A.3, there is an extension e˜ of e such that
c is a chain of e˜. Since the number of steps of c is the same in e and e˜. This proves (i).
Proof of (ii). If c is some e-chain where e is a q-enumeration, such that g(c) achieves
the minimum defined in the statement, then, in view of lemma A.2, there exists some
e-gap h that does not intersect c. In view of lemma A.3, there is an extension e˜ of e
such that c is a chain of e˜. Since the number of steps and gaps in c remain the same,
(ii) is proved. 2
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